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1 INTRODUCTION  
In her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker develops an account of two kinds 
of epistemic injustice. Her focus is on unjustifiable systemic disadvantages from which members 
of oppressed groups suffer when they 1) seek to offer testimony to others about what they know 
and 2) to interpret their own social position and life experience. She calls the unjust burdens of 
interpreting one’s position and experience “hermeneutical injustice.” Despite the intuitive appeal 
of her account of such injustice, Fricker has been criticized for falsely assuming a monolithic 
view of the interpretive resources available in a society. In this thesis, I rebut such criticisms by 
arguing that they overlook the extent to which hermeneutical injustice is a matter of the 
distribution of epistemic labor. By epistemic labor, I mean very generally the effort exerted in 
forming, questioning, and revising beliefs and in seeking resources to support this process. 
Fricker’s account neglects to explicitly identify this aspect of hermeneutical injustice, but, as I 
will argue, including the special burden carried by marginalized groups in our understanding of 
hermeneutical injustice makes sense of this injustice in a way that is compatible with epistemic 
agency and even epistemic advantages of the oppressed.  
José Medina offers a pluralized analysis of hermeneutical resources available to the 
oppressed which is sensitive to the variety and dynamicity of the interpretations available within 
marginalized communities. While his analysis accurately captures certain features of the 
dynamic reality of social epistemic interaction, I argue that Medina’s account fails to recognize 
the injustice of the special burden members of marginalized groups confront in making sense of 
their social experiences. What he identifies as epistemic virtues (often developed by the 
oppressed) are often domain-specific, and thus the sense-making effort exerted by the oppressed 
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is better described as epistemic labor made necessary by the hermeneutical marginalization of 
one’s group than as the performance of epistemic virtues.  
 In what follows, I begin in section II by outlining the types of epistemic injustices 
Miranda Fricker identifies. In section III I turn to a critic of her work in order to show that the 
development of non-dominant or resistant hermeneutical resources involves significant work, 
and in section IV I argue that this work in fact is a component of hermeneutical injustice. In 
section VI I argue that Medina’s analysis of the epistemic virtues developed in oppressive 
contexts does not register this type of harm. I reject Medina’s claim that epistemic advantages 
originate from virtues commonly found among the oppressed, and argue instead that oppression 
often makes it the case that oppressed subjects’ epistemic needs align with true beliefs about 
their situation, yet these beliefs are made less accessible to those who would (most) benefit from 
them by hermeneutical marginalization. Finally, in section VIII I argue that Medina’s addition to 
(or expansion of) Fricker’s hermeneutical sensitivity should be distinguished as a second type of 
responsibility given agents’ quotidian interests in avoiding inordinate epistemic labor and in 
holding beliefs that are simply accurate enough to serve their needs.  
2 FRICKER’S INJUSTICES 
Miranda Fricker distinguishes two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and 
hermeneutical. Both kinds operate according to identity power, which Fricker defines as “a form 
of social power which is directly dependent upon shared social-imaginative conceptions of the 
social identities of those implicated in the particular operation of power.” (2007: 4) Thus, both 
forms of injustice are part of the broader category of identity-based social injustice. Testimonial 
injustice involves diminished credibility accorded to a person’s testimony in light of their 
(perceived) social type. Fricker’s paradigmatic example of this form of injustice is the police’s 
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disbelief of a black person’s word. Testimonial injustice is rooted in the prejudice of a hearer and 
perpetrated by that hearer. By contrast, hermeneutical injustice is not committed by some agent. 
Fricker writes that “no agent perpetrates hermeneutical injustice—it is a purely structural 
notion,” (2007:159) defined as “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social 
experience obscured from collective understanding owing to hermeneutical marginalization.” 
(2007:158) Hermeneutical marginalization refers to an oppressed group’s exclusion from the 
prominent meaning-making roles of a society such as careers in law, journalism, and academia. 
A paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice is a person’s confusion about their own queer 
sexuality or gender identity in circumstances that allow no exposure or access to others with 
comparable identities or to other sources of information such as literature.1  
Fricker acknowledges that instances of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are 
possible outside of more general systems of oppression but focuses on the systemic variety. She 
notes that hermeneutical injustice is closely connected to the testimonial variety, writing that the 
fact “that hermeneutical injustice most typically manifests itself in the speaker struggling to 
make herself intelligible in a testimonial exchange raises a grim possibility: that hermeneutical 
injustice might often be compounded by testimonial injustice.” (2007: 159) Critics have taken 
issue with Fricker’s discussion of hermeneutical injustice on the grounds that it presupposes 
some single, coherent system of shared ideas available to the members of a given society for 
making sense of their experiences in which hermeneutical resources either circulate or do not. In 
reality, her critics point out, there is no such single, coherent system.  I now turn to a prominent 
critic who argues along these lines.  
                                                          
1 Exposure to models with like identities that is heavily mediated by oppressive hermeneutical resources can also 
contribute to hermeneutical injustice, though a straightforward lack of exposure to similar others more 
straightforwardly contributes to an unjust hermeneutical lacuna.  
4 
 
3 A CRITIQUE OF FRICKER’S ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTIVE 
HERMENEUTICAL RESOURCE 
Rebecca Mason identifies in Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice a failure to 
distinguish various social knowledge-sharing groups. While Fricker points out that 
hermeneutical injustice depends on “shared social-imaginative conceptions of the social 
identities of those implicated in the particular operation of power,” (2007: 4 emphasis added) 
Mason argues that Fricker does not pay sufficient attention to the multiplicity of communities 
which internally share social-imaginative conceptions. Making use of Charles Mills’ account of 
the ignorance of dominant groups to the conditions of the groups they oppress, Mason argues 
that the conflation of hermeneutical resources of dominant and marginalized/oppressed groups 
into those of a single universal social discourse undervalues the hermeneutical resources 
available to members of oppressed groups. Mason writes, “Fricker problematically identifies 
‘collective’ hermeneutical resources with that which is articulated and taken up in dominant 
discourses” (2011: 298) and holds that this is problematic in that it “pays insufficient attention to 
non-dominant hermeneutical resources to which members of marginalized groups have access in 
order to render their social experiences communicatively intelligible.” (2011: 298) Because, 
according to Mason, members of marginalized groups are in fact capable (even uniquely 
capable) of understanding and testifying to their experiences, the injustice committed when an 
experience of oppression is not recognized by the dominant social discourse is not a structural 
phenomena which results in the inability of members of the marginalized groups to make sense 
of their experiences of marginalization in a way that can be communicated to others.  
Mason highlights an example given by Fricker of a case of hermeneutical injustice which 
she takes to show that Fricker does not attribute proper epistemic agency to marginalized 
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subjects who “have non-dominant interpretive resources from which they can draw to understand 
and describe their experiences despite absences or distortions that exist in so-called collective 
hermeneutical resources.” (2011: 295) In this case, a woman, Carmita Wood, experienced 
repeated sexual harassment before it was so named. Wood eventually quit her job because of the 
harassment and was denied unemployment insurance. In response to the denial, Wood sought out 
feminist activists who both assisted her in legal recourse for the denial of unemployment 
insurance and held a conference during which women shared their experiences of sexual 
harassment and together gave it this name. Mason denies that Wood’s experience was rendered 
unintelligible (a component of hermeneutical injustice according to Fricker), writing that Wood’s 
responses to the insurance claim denial “were not the actions of a woman mystified by her 
experiences of a yet-to-be-named phenomenon.”  (2011: 297)  
Mason concludes, pace Fricker, that hermeneutical injustice can not be a purely structural 
phenomenon that is not perpetrated by any specific person or persons. Rather, we see case after 
case of hermeneutical resources forged within oppressed groups which, in spite of being well-
developed and readily communicated, are resisted by specific members of mainstream society. 
Mason makes the point that for Wood, “rather than functioning as ‘a life-changing flash of 
enlightenment,’ naming [sexual harassment] created a hermeneutical environment conducive to 
organized social activism against one manifestation of sexism” (2011: 298). Mason adds, “the 
act of naming in which Wood participated incited social change.” (2011: 298) So Mason shows 
us that while Wood surely gained a deeper understanding of the universality of sexual 
harassment through talking to women about their similar experiences, the primary injustice she 
suffered came from the failure by those in positions of power to recognize the experiences she 
attempted to communicate. Her experience was not ultimately unintelligible. Mason proposes 
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that “an unknowing to which members of dominant groups are subject by virtue of their ethically 
bad knowledge practices” (2011: 295) better characterizes what Fricker describes as a 
hermeneutical gap.  
In sum, Mason holds that members of oppressed groups are positioned to more readily 
understand their oppression than are members of dominant groups. Gaps in the hermeneutical 
resources of the dominant social sphere are not to be identified with gaps in the resources of 
oppressed groups. Fricker’s paradigm example of hermeneutical injustice reveals that the victim 
of still-unnamed sexual harassment in fact had a keen understanding of her experience and its 
connection to her broader oppression and so did not suffer under the interpretive gap Fricker 
takes as the core problem of hermeneutical injustice. According to Mason, by failing to 
recognize that understanding, Fricker contributes to the injustice suffered by the oppressed. That 
is, Mason takes issue with “Fricker’s claim that a ‘gap’ in collective hermeneutical resources 
prevents marginalized subjects from understanding their own experiences” (2011: 295) on the 
grounds that it is both inaccurate and ethically irresponsible. In the following section I argue that 
while it is true that the oppressed can and do develop hermeneutical resources appropriate to 
their experiences, hermeneutical injustice makes it the case that access to these resources 
involves work that would not be necessary absent hermeneutical marginalization. 
4 IN DEFENSE OF A MONOLITHIC SOCIAL MILIEU (TWO KINDS OF 
HARMS) 
In this section I argue that hermeneutical injustice is not simply a straightforward 
problem of lacking interpretive resources (as much of Fricker’s language suggests). It is also a 
problem of the burden confronted by the oppressed of recreating interpretive resources that 
others in their group have already created but have been unable to effectively circulate 
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throughout the group, and a problem of the communication of the relevant experiences to others 
requiring inordinate effort. I argue that Mason mistakenly concludes that Wood’s demonstration 
of some understanding of the injustice done to her implies the absence of hermeneutical 
injustice. In order to demonstrate that hermeneutical injustice is operative even when oppressed 
subjects have well-developed hermeneutical resources, I will distinguish two kinds of wrongful 
harms which hermeneutical injustice may cause. I do not mean this distinction to be exhaustive 
of the sorts of harms constitutive of or caused by hermeneutical injustice. Nor do I claim to 
identify an empirically clean distinction. Rather, the distinction is meant to clarify some ways in 
which lucidity, epistemic advantages, and hermeneutical injustices can co-occur.  
First, hermeneutical injustice inflicts wrongful harm insofar as the truth about some 
social phenomenon is obscured or rendered unintelligible. Second, hermeneutical injustice 
inflicts wrongful harm insofar as members of marginalized groups must exert inordinate effort in 
order to benefit from their epistemic community. Mason takes Fricker to be claiming that the 
first sort of harm affected Carmita Wood before sexual harassment was so named. When a 
straightforward gap exists in the interpretive resources of a community, those with an interest in 
the relevant understanding experience a hermeneutical injustice. Mason is right to point out that 
Carmita Wood did not suffer this sort of injustice because she did not suffer under a total 
hermeneutical lacuna. We can expect hermeneutical injustices of this sort to most intensely affect 
those who have little to no exposure to others with similar experiences and/or who have had few 
similar experiences themselves. 
Although Fricker sometimes writes as though understanding one’s social experience is a 
binary on/off property, her examples of hermeneutical injustice suggest that a complete lack of 
understanding is not all that she intends hermeneutical injustice to reference. It is clear that 
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Carmita Wood had some understanding of her experience. Portions of her response to the 
experience demonstrate her understanding. (Seeking feminist lawyers, requesting a transfer, etc.) 
But rather than comparing Carmita Wood’s behaviors to what we would expect of someone who 
completely lacked understanding of her situation, we might compare her behaviors and 
communicative efforts to what we would expect if the “background condition of hermeneutical 
injustice” (2007:159) were absent. If Wood experienced unwanted sexual advances from her 
supervisor within a culture that readily recognized these actions as worthy of punishment and 
part of a more general pattern of quotidian oppression, we can imagine that Wood may not have 
initially taken it upon herself to try to avoid the harassment. She might have quickly reported to 
her supervisor if she had reason to believe her report would be believed and addressed, and may 
not have developed physical symptoms of stress as she attempted to avoid interactions with her 
harasser. While Wood had some understanding of her experience, a well-developed 
comprehension of sexual harassment as common, undeserved, and connected to wider injustices 
was not readily available to her or to those whose understanding of her experience might have 
contributed to a just response.  
When members of a group with similar social experiences are excluded from the 
meaning-making roles of their society (however informal these roles may be), the resources they 
discover or invent as they meet their epistemic needs often constitute a re-creation of 
hermeneutical resources which, absent hermeneutical marginalization, would be (more) readily 
available. The hermeneutically marginalized, in order to simply meet their communicative needs 
and to achieve a level of understanding which could ease the cognitive discomfort that comes 
from what Mills has described as “the phenomenological experience of the disjuncture between 
official (white) reality and actual (nonwhite) experience,” (1997:109) often must re-invent the 
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conceptual wheel from their pre-theoretic experiences. As Mason’s example of the well-
developed hermeneutical resources of racialized groups illustrates, it is sometimes possible for 
the oppressed to separate from the dominant group and to create and circulate interpretive 
resources among themselves. By limiting their epistemic community to exclude their oppressors, 
the oppressed may create an environment in which they can have (relatively easier) access to the 
benefits of their epistemic community.2 The labor of theorizing some sort of experience can be 
eased when those with similar experiences have already developed and circulated relevant 
interpretive heuristics. 
The conference which named sexual harassment developed the participating women’s 
ability to quickly communicate about an experience, but it is not true, as Mason makes clear, that 
“the lexical gap that was later filled in with the name sexual harassment rendered women’s 
experience of it confused and inarticulate.” (2011: 297) While Mason’s identification of 
marginalized hermeneutical resources is an important contribution to and critique of Fricker’s 
account of hermeneutical injustice, Mason overlooks the fact that marginalized groups interact 
with their oppressors and do not reap the full epistemic benefits of their communities even as 
they work to overcome their epistemic marginalization. It is notable that Mason relies 
particularly on examples of the epistemic resources of members of marginalized racial groups 
while Fricker focuses more on the experiences of women and LGBTQ+ people. Although the 
pattern is nuanced, it is broadly true that women are dispersed throughout the population, while 
marginalized racial groups maintain a higher degree of separation from the dominant racial 
group. While people of color clearly do interact with whites, women are the prototypical 
                                                          
2 I do not claim that oppressed groups need not interact with their oppressors, but that they are in different ways 
able to separate, and to the extent that they can create their own truly separate social epistemic community they 
do not experience or are more readily able to overcome hermeneutical injustice. 
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example of a group dispersed among their oppressors. Other examples of dispersal are 
marginalized genders, sexual minorities, and people with certain disabilities or chronic illnesses, 
and for these groups, dispersal is further compounded by their being fewer in number than 
women. To the extent that an oppressed group is excluded from the (dominant) discourse within 
their own society, they will find hermeneutical resources appropriate to their experiences lacking 
or obscured, and so are deprived of the full benefits of access to others’ epistemic labor.  
Mason draws attention to the existence of well-developed hermeneutical resources among 
the marginalized, but their development is not automatic, and access to resources normally 
requires communication among the marginalized. This communication involves less work 
wherever the oppressed interact with other members of their oppressed group in daily life3. As 
Mills points out, members of oppressed groups have an epistemic advantage in the sense of 
dissonance between received white theory and actual non-white experience, and he notes that 
this dissonance “generates an alternative moral and political perception of social reality.” (1997: 
109, emphasis added) While an alternative perception is to some degree available to all members 
of oppressed groups, since it is founded in individual experience, the collective alternative 
hermeneutical resources that arise from reflection on these individual perceptions are not given. 
Rather, they are generated through hard-fought resistance to dominant hermeneutical resources 
and entrenched hermeneutical lacunae, and this resistance is made more burdensome by 
members of an oppressed group’s lack of contact with similar others. 
At times, Fricker seems to suggest that her conception of hermeneutical injustice includes 
the varied epistemic burdens it creates for the oppressed. She notes the importance of courage in 
full epistemic development, and writes that “when you find yourself in a situation in which you 
                                                          
3 This is of course complicated by internalized oppressive ideology, but Mills points out that the epistemic 
advantage of a peculiar phenomenology remains even among the actively ignorant.  
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seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received understanding and your own 
intimated sense of a given experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make 
sense of the world, or at least the relevant region of the world.” (2007: 163) Fricker notes that it 
is nonetheless the case that we can “put a number of people together who have felt a certain 
dissonance about an area of social experience… and… the sense of dissonance can increase and 
become critically emboldened.” (2007: 168) While Mason is right to note that the oppressed 
often have access to hermeneutical resources of their own, she does not adequately deal with the 
asymmetric epistemic burdens carried by the oppressed, whose received interpretive heuristics 
diverge significantly from their phenomenology, more starkly than for those whose experiences 
are better represented by dominant hermeneutical resources. The hermeneutical resources most 
readily available, especially to those dispersed among their oppressors, are typically those that 
reflect the ideas of those who hold power within society. The resistant resources, which are not 
represented in dominant popular media, public discourse, law, etc. are generally less accessible. 
In her discussion of the virtue of testimonial justice, Fricker introduces a distinction 
between “routine discursive moves in a moral discourse and exceptional, more imaginative 
moves in which existing resources are used in an innovative way that stands as a progressive 
move in moral consciousness.” (2007: 104) Each individual or group who creates resistant 
hermeneutical resources will, because of the ubiquitous dominant discourse, need to make 
exceptional discursive moves to gain an accurate understanding of their situation. The loss of 
epistemic confidence that results from making repeated exceptional moves will vary according to 
that person’s discourse among others with similar experiences4. Dispersal of the oppressed 
among their oppressors can thus function to diminish epistemic confidence and make it more 
                                                          
4 It will also depend on the personality and body of similar experiences within one’s own life, as well as the degree 
to which the exceptional discursive moves challenge nearby beliefs.  
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difficult for members of oppressed groups to develop their individual understandings of their 
peculiar phenomenology. 
There is textual evidence that Fricker factors these effects of dispersal into her account of 
hermeneutical injustice. She gives an example of a young boy growing up and developing an 
understanding of his sexuality, writing “as he grows up, he has to contend with various powerful 
bogeyman constructions of The Homosexual. None of them fits, but these collective 
understandings are so powerful, and the personal experiential promise of an alternative 
understanding so lonely and inarticulate.” (2007: 165) Further, she notes that there are typically 
norms of social epistemic interaction counteracting such dispersal: “Even in the most severely 
oppressive societies, members of the most subordinated groups will rely on and cooperate 
epistemically with each other, and this will remain so even if they have internalized the 
oppressive ideology to a significant degree.” (2007: 131) Thus, in spite of her occasional binary 
language about understanding or misunderstanding, we can best make sense of Fricker’s account 
of hermeneutical injustice as positing a spectrum of intensity from the most severe forms, 
involving complete isolation with access only to one’s own individual pre-theoretic experiences 
to less severe forms, involving hermeneutical resources shared to various degrees across an 
oppressed group but unintelligible or unfamiliar to one’s oppressors or to those who have limited 
contact with similar others. 
Fricker writes that hermeneutical injustice renders an experience “inadequately 
conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves” (2007:6) While 
Mason interprets her to suggest that the relevant experience is unintelligible including to one’s 
self, I understand Fricker to mean that an experience is rendered unintelligible only in its more 
intense forms even to the subject. I now turn to Medina’s analysis of epistemic virtues and argue 
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that the ostensibly virtuous actions he identifies lack key features of epistemic virtues but are 
similar to the sort of resistant epistemic labor Mason points us toward among the oppressed, 
which I have argued is a component of hermeneutical injustice. 
5 MEDINA’S EPISTEMIC VIRTUES  
Medina introduces his discussion of epistemic virtues and vices by noting that “epistemic 
advantages and disadvantages, fortunately, do not correlate perfectly with non-epistemic forms 
of privilege and oppression.” (2013:28-9) He draws attention to some epistemic advantages of 
the oppressed and epistemic disadvantages of oppressors, and identifies three epistemic virtues 
that are often demonstrated by the oppressed but rare among oppressors: epistemic humility, 
intellectual curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness. He argues that we should not give a 
“prima facie presumption of epistemic superiority” (2013:45) to specific perspectives of 
oppressed subjects, but that distinctive experiences unique to the oppressed can affect the 
epistemic character of subjects such that they are able to develop a subversive lucidity about 
oppression. In the following sections I argue against the proposal that lucidity about oppression 
is evidence of epistemic virtues’ prevalence among the oppressed. The argument hinges on the 
domain-specificity of apparent epistemic virtues, and since, for better or worse, attitudes about 
one’s intellectual abilities and limitations are often relatively global, I will focus here on 
Medina’s analysis of intellectual curiosity/diligence and open-mindedness.  
Intellectual curiosity/diligence, according to Medina, includes “answering cognitive calls 
to find out, to face epistemic challenges head-on, to meet cognitive demands, etc.” (2013:51) 
This virtue involves the motivation to acknowledge one’s epistemic limits and to persevere in the 
actions required to overcome them. Medina describes open-mindedness as “the epistemic feat of 
maintaining active in [one’s mind] two cognitive perspectives simultaneously as [one performs] 
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various tasks.” (2013:44) Epistemic open-mindedness, he argues, is also found 
disproportionately often among the oppressed, since “oppressed subjects tend to feel the need of 
being more attentive to the perspectives of others. They have no option but to acknowledge, 
respect, and (to some extent) inhabit alternative perspectives, in particular the perspective of the 
dominant other(s).” (2013: 44) Just as Medina’s open-mindedness is something the oppressed are 
more or less forced into exhibiting, Medina explains that intellectual curiosity/diligence is 
prevalent among the oppressed as a result of their peculiar needs. He writes, “Oppressed subjects 
frequently find themselves forced to acquire deep familiarity with certain domains, developing 
forms of expertise that no one else has.” (2013:44) While the virtue-based explanation of 
epistemic advantages possessed by the oppressed is compelling, I maintain that the epistemic 
labor occasioned by hermeneutical injustice provides a simpler and more accurate explanation of 
those advantages which simultaneously respects the burdensome nature of hermeneutical 
marginalization. 
6 APPARENT EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AS EPISTEMIC LABOR  
While it is true that oppression necessitates curiosity, diligence, and open-mindedness 
about certain epistemic affairs, it is not clear that the virtues of epistemic curiosity/diligence and 
open-mindedness are evidenced by (even compelling and well-developed) perspectives about 
oppression. As I have argued above, hermeneutical marginalization makes it the case that 
accessing, forming, and circulating hermeneutical resources are burdensome tasks. Achieving 
lucidity about oppression, then, often requires epistemic labor that may appear (and may be) 
virtuous as the oppressed acquire the interpretive resources which are in their interests yet 
obscured by hermeneutical injustice. That the oppressed on average put in much effort to form, 
consider, and circulate certain beliefs, though, even if these beliefs turn out to be true, is a 
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necessary but not sufficient condition for epistemically virtuous activity. We should expect those 
who possess the virtue of open-mindedness, for example, to examine potential challenges or 
alternatives to many of their beliefs, or for the epistemically curious and diligent to persevere in 
discovering truths generally, but as Medina points out, “having one kind of multiplicitous or 
kaleidoscopic consciousness does not guarantee lucidity with respect to other forms of 
oppression.” (2013:202) Even racist women, classist queers, and sexist people of color may 
possess non-trivial domain-specific phenomenological and reflective epistemic advantages about 
their own oppression without a general disposition toward open-mindedness, epistemic 
curiosity/diligence, or other intellectual virtues.   
Though complicated by intersectionality, the interests of the oppressed more often are in 
truths about the relevant social experience than are the interests of the oppressors, who may 
benefit from the circulation of false beliefs. Meeting one’s epistemic needs will on average 
produce truth more often when one’s interests align with truth. Epistemic virtues can aid in this 
process but are not necessary for there to be a higher probability of accuracy among the 
perspectives of the oppressed. Of course, we may also find that the oppressed are more likely to 
develop actual epistemic virtues, but these are not necessary for the domain-specific epistemic 
advantages Medina claims they reveal. Evidence of epistemically virtuous activity is more 
clearly demonstrated by resistant perspectives on oppression held by those who do not 
experience the type of oppression in question than by resistant perspectives held by the 
relevantly oppressed. 
7 MEDINA’S HERMENEUTICAL SENSITIVITY 
 For Fricker, the virtue of hermeneutical justice “is an alertness or sensitivity to the 
possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to render something 
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communicatively intelligible is due… to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical resources.” 
(2007: 169) It therefore applies when one has already become (in some way) aware of the 
relevant type(s) of oppression. She cautions, though, that “hermeneutical marginalization is first 
and foremost the product of unequal relations of social power more generally, and as such is not 
the sort of thing that could itself be eradicated by what we do as virtuous hearers alone.” 
(2007:174) Fricker’s virtue of hermeneutical justice functions much like a domain-specific 
epistemic humility.  
Medina rejects Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice as fundamentally a structural 
injustice which is not perpetrated by agents and argues that “hermeneutically sensitive and alert 
interlocutors can contribute to bring about hermeneutical justice.” (2013:113) He holds that 
agents resist new hermeneutical resources but could do much to avoid the reinforcement of 
hermeneutical injustice, and so argues for an expanded responsibility of hearers with respect to 
hermeneutical injustice. Medina writes, “for as long as we remain entrenched in dynamics that 
block new forms of understanding and foster communicative dysfunctions, we are contributing 
to hermeneutical marginalization and, if that marginalization is based on identity prejudices and 
correlated with disparities in identity power, we are perpetrating a hermeneutical injustice.” 
(2013:111) For Medina, resisting hermeneutical injustice and refraining from reinforcing it 
require a more robust virtue of hermeneutical sensitivity than Fricker proposes. He argues that 
the responsibility for perpetrating hermeneutical injustices corresponds to one’s social roles, with 
academics and journalists carrying relatively more responsibility than parents and teachers, who 
are still more responsible than those who do not participate significantly in the epistemic 
development of others. Medina calls for all subjects, though, to become “hermeneutically open,” 
(2013:114) which means “being alert and sensitive to eccentric voices and styles as well as to 
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nonstandard meanings and interpretative perspectives.” (2013:114) The openness Medina calls 
for is not domain-specific and does not apply only where some form of oppression is identified 
as relevant. 
In what follows, I argue that Medina’s expanded hermeneutical sensitivity is not so much 
an expansion of Fricker’s hermeneutical sensitivity as a distinct obligation of epistemic humility. 
In distinguishing the domain-specific hermeneutical sensitivity Fricker calls for from Medina’s 
more global and eternally open sensitivity, I acknowledge the interest agents may have in 
achieving rough social understandings which allow for rest from epistemic labor and some ways 
in which hermeneutical injustice, even as it is successfully resisted, limits the choices of 
oppressed agents. 
8 MEDINA’S HERMENEUTICAL SENSITIVITY AS EPISTEMIC HUMILITY 
I wholeheartedly agree with Medina’s call for an ever-open sensitivity to the possibility 
of new experiences and new interpretations of apparently familiar experiences, but I maintain 
that this global sensitivity is distinct from a hermeneutical sensitivity which responds to 
identified forms of oppression, in that it functions more like a truly global or general epistemic 
humility than does Fricker’s domain-specific response. 
Medina rightfully points out that dominant social understandings can be rough and 
inaccurate. He compares the understandings queer people often have of their sexuality to those 
which straight people, who are not expected to deny, repress, and question their attractions 
develop. The former tend to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of sexuality than the latter. 
In presenting the epistemic benefits of being queer in a heteronormative society, though, Medina 
fails to note the privilege of having relatively easy access to a simple and easily communicated 
explanation for one’s experiences, even if it does not quite fit all the nuances of one’s 
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phenomenology. The dominant in this way enjoy the right to choose to pursue a more developed 
understanding of some experience simply for the epistemic benefits of the pursuit, or to avoid 
such a pursuit in favor of rest from epistemic labor or directing one’s efforts elsewhere. There is 
significant privilege in the freedom to choose where to focus one’s epistemic labors which 
hermeneutical marginalization limits for the oppressed by both making it the case that only meta-
lucid interpretations will be accurate enough to meet (some of) their epistemic needs, and by 
vitiating the circulation of resistant perspectives so that shared experiences might be more 
readily, if roughly, understood by those who would find them helpful.  
Medina is right to point out that the interpretive resources of any group are inherently 
inadequate for providing a fully nuanced understanding of some social experience and that 
understanding better describes a goal toward which hermeneutical resources point than a 
description of what they provide. In praising the meta-lucidity of resistant interpretive resources, 
though, Medina overlooks the interest agents may have in resting from the epistemic labor 
involved in working toward understanding. A concept like “gay,” in spite of its inability to 
capture much about a person’s experiences of attraction and love, can be helpful for those who 
wish to simply introduce their partner to others as a romantic partner of the same gender and to 
end the theorizing about gender and sexuality at that. Those who employ such rough concepts are 
nonetheless rightfully called to recognize that the concepts they use are simply tools for 
communicating about and achieving some understanding of one’s experiences. Epistemic 
humility, that is, is appropriate for all hermeneutical resources.  
Fricker’s domain-specific epistemic humility, though, which requires a targeted epistemic 
humility when one has recognized that oppression may make a person or group’s ability to 
theorize and communicate about their experience more burdensome, can not be expanded to the 
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virtue of hermeneutical sensitivity that Medina calls for. Our obligations toward identified 
systems of oppression are distinct from our obligations toward social concepts generally. If the 
domain-specific humility Fricker calls for is simply a part of an obligation we have toward all 
hermeneutical resources, it is difficult to make sense of the difference between, for example, a 
call for white subjects to listen carefully to perspectives on racialized experience from people of 
color, and a call for openness toward some new interpretation about racialized reality which 
paints white subjects as the ultimate victims of racism. The latter, though prima facie untenable, 
and easily considered a waste of epistemic labor, is not ruled out by Medina’s call for an ever-
open sensitivity toward the possibilities of new interpretations. We can more readily make sense 
of a blameless choice to pause in the exercise of a global epistemic humility than a blameless 
choice to pause from the exercise of epistemic humility toward testimony about experiences of 
oppression from those whose testimony about oppression is supported by empirical and historical 
evidence of such oppression. 
I worry that Medina’s hermeneutical openness can do very little to shift the burden of 
epistemic labor from oppressed subjects and risks attributing disproportionate credit to dominant 
subjects who respond well to the testimony of marginalized subjects. The phenomenon of white 
ignorance becoming gradually less suited to whites’ experiences demonstrates the reduction of 
epistemic privilege through structural changes which require more epistemic labor from whites, 
but it is not clear that dominant subjects can take much credit for this epistemic achievement. 
Medina writes, 
“Given the new social and cultural conditions of today, it is increasingly hard for whiteness to 
remain invisible… Many subjects who were recruited to arrogant white perception in subtle ways 
during their upbringing and early socialization find many opportunities throughout their lives to 
grow uncomfortable with this racial way of seeing and to develop a critical distance with it. More 
and more subjects find it difficult to inhabit the white gaze as a matter of course- no questions 
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asked, no worry felt. Farewell to an invisible and uninterrogated white common sense.” 
(2013:217) 
 
As white subjects’ epistemic needs have shifted, their epistemic behavior has adjusted. Some, of 
course, may work harder to maintain an active ignorance, while others respond by questioning 
the racialized narratives with which they were raised and listening to the testimony of people of 
color. Both responses require epistemic labor. The latter response, though, is better described as 
a communicative achievement by people of color (perhaps supported by the virtue of testimonial 
sensitivity) than a demonstration of hermeneutical sensitivity by whites.  
Filming and sharing interactions with the police, for example, is a means of resisting 
hermeneutical injustice, but whites who have been unfamiliar with police violence and 
mistreatment of people of color yet begin to accept the reality of racism when exposed to such 
testimony have simply avoided discounting testimony about racism because it is made by people 
of color, and so have simply not perpetrated testimonial injustice. Dominant subjects do not 
universally resist novel or unfamiliar understandings of social phenomena, and a blanket 
suspicion of the novel does not constitute an injustice. 
Medina rightly calls us to recognize that even our resistant hermeneutical resources are 
heuristics and never perfectly accurate truths, given the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the 
social experiences hermeneutical resources address, but the imperfect heuristics to which this 
humility is rightfully applied may be more or less accurate, and so exceptional discursive moves 
of different intensities may be demanded by the epistemic needs of different subjects.  
9 CONCLUSION 
I have argued that hermeneutical injustice is best understood as including the inordinate 
effort required by oppressed subjects to meet their epistemic needs. Hermeneutical 
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marginalization does not prevent subjects from making sense of their experiences, but it makes it 
the case that understanding and communicating about those experiences involves more work 
than would be necessary if those with similar experiences were accorded full participation in the 
mainstream epistemic community. While some may develop epistemic virtues as they do this 
work, epistemic virtues are not necessary to accord a higher probability of truth to the 
perspectives developed by oppressed subjects than to those developed by their oppressors. 
Generally, the oppressed must develop their hermeneutical resources with those who have 
somewhat shared experiences. The role of the oppressors in response to this development is most 
centrally to exhibit the virtue of testimonial sensitivity. 
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